Lessons from North Korean casualties in Kursk

North Korean special forces training in October 2024. Image | KCNA

After its deployment to Russia to the front line fighting Ukrainians, the Korean People’s Army suffered a high attrition rate in the first few weeks and has been withdrawn and is reportedly regrouping. The high casualty rate reveals a general lack of preparedness and a particular lack of training in drone warfare.  

North Korea backed Russia in the war from the outset. In late 2022, it supplied artillery shells to the Wagner  Group. Then in 2023, Pyongyang ramped up support, allocating one million artillery shells and 7,000 tons of military equipment to its ally. 

Then, on June 18, 2024, Pyongyang and Moscow solidified a mutual defense pact after a summit in Vladivostok. The Strategic Comprehensive Partnership allows further defense cooperation, which includes the sharing of missiles and chips to enhance the DPRK’s missile program. 

The KPA is believed to have sent 12,000 troops to Kursk Oblast as an expeditionary force to supplement Russia’s overstretched forces.  

Direct military intervention in Kursk

The KPA amassed units alongside Russian forces in November and joined large-scale maneuvers in December. In recent weeks, casualties have been high during assaults against the  Ukrainian army.  

According to the White House and US Department of Defense, North Korea has suffered over 1,000  casualties since the start of its offensive operations. The Ukrainian government claims that up to 3,000 KPA soldiers have been killed or wounded.  

According to South Korean reports, more KPA units are ready to be transferred if the Kremlin requests additional assistance. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky and the intelligence directorate also expressed concern about new KPA reinforcements.

What is behind the high casualties? 

Several factors contribute to the high casualty rate. One basic factor is the language barrier. Without clear communication and coordination, KPA troops are harder to command during  assaults and, therefore, risk unnecessary casualties. Compare this with the Ukrainian military which has requested that foreign volunteers learn the local languages.  

Secondly, the senior Korean officers have failed to conduct thorough battlefield site surveys and prepare the troops for first-person view (FPV) drones and electronic warfare countermeasures.  Adaptations in drone warfare, particularly in Kursk, contributed to high casualties and equipment  losses due to the new fiber optic drones, which can bypass electronic countermeasures.  

The failure of North Korean commanders to effectively prepare shows more than a simple lack of care for their troops. It highlights the minimal authority that field and senior commanders have in a hereditary totalitarian government. 

Tragically, Pyongyang and Moscow have shown that they are willing to sacrifice as many as their troops as necessary to achieve mission objectives, whereas Kyiv is struggling with unit staffing and  recruitment. It currently remains to be seen if the current Russian and North Korean frontal  assaults into fields of fire will play out positively for them. 

Lessons for NATO and allied nations  

The North Korean intervention in the Ukraine war shows why unit cohesion, proficient communications, leader-in-field commanders, and command and control must be emphasized for any deployable unit.  

As noted, language barriers have only heightened casualties. Emphasizing basic language phrases related to combat can save lives and mitigate mission failures. 

Secondly, the lack of awareness of drone warfare by KPA leadership left the inexperienced North Korean conscripts blind as to what they may have expected in Kursk. The introduction of fiber optic drones alone is a major concern for the future of modern warfare.  

A potential Taiwan Straits crisis could see Beijing implement a mass drone swarm (including fiber optics) against Taipei to besiege the island, and Washington and its East Asian allies must  prepare for such contingencies via anti-drone countermeasures. 

Third, motivating inexperienced troops for the worst-case scenarios can help lower-ranking  personnel to avoid complacency under fire. Due to the high losses in Kursk, several North Korean units will inevitably have to reconstitute with war-weary conscripts and perhaps merge into Russian units.  

Whereas Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un can get away with a high casualty rate due to strong  control of media and authoritarian rule, western militaries will inevitably face scrutiny, even  with moderate losses, as seen with the United States during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. 

Julian McBride
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