The race for long-range missiles between Japan and North Korea

Eastern Asia is witnessing a military buildup not seen since the aftermath of WWII. North Korea is becoming an ever greater rogue regime, with increasing military capabilities that pose an existential threat to all countries in the Indo-Pacific region.
Japan faces a particular threat from North Korea’s missiles, and the fact that Pyongyang still sees Tokyo as one of its ancestral enemies. In response, Japan will also need to grow its own missile fleet.
The North has one of the world’s largest militaries in terms of manpower but it suffers from major flaws in logistics, global sanctions, and a lack of recovery from the Korean War. This stagnation makes it rely on its nuclear program and growing missile stockpiles.
The Korean People’s Army (KPA) designates its Strategic Force (KPASF) as a specialized unit for missiles. The Strategic Force is responsible for mobile, submarine, and silo- based rocket strikes and missile tests.
Currently, the KPASF employs a diverse range of missiles to instill both fear and deterrence in the region. The Hwasal and KN variations are cruise and short-range ballistic missiles with a top range of 1800-2000 and 240-900 km respectively.
The KPASF’s medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) arsenal consists of the Hwasong 7, 9, and Pukguksong-2. The Hwasong-9 and Pukguksong-2 are upgraded MRBMs fitted with guidance and electronics to meet needs for a potential war with Seoul and Tokyo, as well as nearby American bases.
The Hwasong-16B intermediate-range ballistic missile, successfully tested in 2024, has a range of 1100 to 1500 km. North Korea’s SRBMS, MRBMs, and IRBMS would be the missiles that the KPASF would use the most in an armed conflict against the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).
After decades of pacifism, Japan is preparing a major remilitarization effort in lieu of threats from North Korea, China, and Russia. Diverging from Article 9 of its American-written Constitution, Tokyo recognizes its need to adapt and create a self-sustainable defense and deterrence.
From late 2022 to 2023, Tokyo started a major upgrades of the JSDF. A primary focus on remilitarization has been on air and naval projection, along with missile defense, enhanced partnerships with regional allies, and the development of long-range missiles.
A key aspect of the JSDF will be enhanced partnerships with regional allies, such as Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. Furthermore, establishing closer relations with NATO members and sharing intelligence with Ukraine, which fought the KPA in Kursk, will be critical in strategic planning.
North Korea is increasing its stockpiles of various missiles and growing more active and hostile not only in the Indo-Pacific but also in Europe, as seen in Kursk. Besides the troops, it sent dozens, possibly hundreds, of SRBMs for Russia to use, with the KPA getting access to post-combat data.
According to the May 2025 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, the North has increased fissile material for approximately 90 nuclear weapons, with 50 currently ready for the KPASF. Furthermore, Russia could transfer key guidance, share intelligence, and satellite systems for the KPASF, which would enhance its ballistic missile fleet.
Regarding Japan’s missile stockpiles, Tokyo finalized the purchase of 200 Block IV and 200 Block V Tomahawk cruise missiles, along with 14 Tomahawk Weapon Control Systems (TWCCS). Furthermore, Japan is developing the Type 12 and 88 variants as part of its domestic push to upgrade long-range missiles.
The Type 12 missiles are designed for surface-to-ship use, providing strategic deterrence and island defense. Type 88 is a ground-launched anti-ship missile that will also serve for island defense. The Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles with Extended Range (JASSM-ER) will also be procured and in JSDF service by 2027, and the missiles will be equipped with internal navigations to predetermined targets.
The Japanese government will need concrete measures, both autonomous and jointly with the United States, in order to counteract North Korea’s growing missile threat. As Pyongyang strengthens its alliance commitments with Moscow, Tokyo will also need a counterbalance with Seoul.
Rapprochement and growing relations between Japan and South Korea have helped Tokyo and Seoul find common ground in the defense, economic, tourism, and technology sectors. Both countries now share intelligence and early warnings about North Korean missile launches.
With its increasing global diplomatic soft power, Japan can also persuade the United States, France, and Britain to put more targeted sanctions against North Korea’s missile program, such as imports of components and electronics needed for the KPASF that other rogue states such as Russia could provide.
Lastly, Japan should continue an aggressive international relations approach in countering North Korea, wherever the Kim regime sets its sights. Taking a more proactive approach to autonomous foreign policy, such as increased engagement by supporting Ukraine, will demonstrate to Pyongyang that Tokyo will counter its unilateral actions with growing intelligence to countries that also fight against aggression.
Employing layered air defense, thorough intelligence capabilities, prudent soft power, enhanced relations with regional partners, and reinvigoration of the JSDF, Japan can counter North Korea’s ever-growing ballistic missile capabilities. Nevertheless, Tokyo will need to continue adapting to the rising threat posed by Pyongyang in the Indo-Pacific by enacting strategic ambiguity and staying one step ahead of the Kim regime.
- The race for long-range missiles between Japan and North Korea - June 27, 2025
- Lessons from North Korean casualties in Kursk - February 4, 2025
- Japan-South Korea relations: the long road ahead - November 23, 2024