Exclusive: Documents and personal items found on the body of a North Korean soldier in Kursk Oblast region (1)

HRF’s Korea Desk has been in regular communication with members of the Ukrainian special forces operating in the Kursk Oblast region since December 20. We have been assisting with the analysis of military documents recovered from North Korean soldiers engaged in combat, as well as providing advice in analyzing North Korean PSYOPs.
On January 9, we received several documents found on the body of a North Korean army officer killed in combat by Ukrainian forces. Unlike other journals and notes recently circulated online, these documents are comprehensive and well-organized. They provide a rare insight into the battlefield experience of the soldiers. They also reveal how the troops interpret what they find and integrate the lessons into their ongoing tactics.
One key document, titled “Combat Experience and Lessons of the 94th Brigade,” appears to have been prepared by North Korean soldiers. The 94th Brigade and the 92nd Brigade are special forces from North Korea operating under the command of Russian units in the Kursk region.
While media reports have suggested that North Korean soldiers may gain valuable combat experience from their involvement in the conflict, this document is the first known instance detailing how this might be happening. It especially details mistakes and lessons learned. This indicates that they are actively refining their combat tactics, while being subject to intense propaganda demanding sacrifices for their Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un.
One of the documents begins with the following statement:
“If all front-line soldiers are prepared with strong ideology, conviction, and high combat morale, even enemies equipped with modern weaponry can be defeated through political and ideological superiority, as well as tactical advantage. During the two-day operation, combatants, despite facing enemy artillery bombardment and suicide drones attacking like swarms of bees, maintained a high level of mental and combat spirit, determined to execute the battle orders of the respected Supreme Commander at the cost of our lives. Displaying self-sacrifice, we advanced like tigers, forcing the enemy equipped with modern weapons to retreat and liberating the Plekhov region.”
In explaining the lessons learned, the document also candidly acknowledges the significant losses. It emphasizes the importance of breaking teams into smaller 2-3 member units to “minimize combat losses” from drone attacks and artillery fire.
“Anti-artillery operations to suppress enemy infantry forces and the neutralization of drone launch points should be carried out in cooperation with Russian forces to minimize combat losses. The failure to preemptively strike the enemy’s artillery and drone launch points in the Guyevo region led to personnel losses. In modern warfare, where real-time reconnaissance and drone strikes are conducted, failing to disperse combat teams into smaller units of 2-3 members could lead to significant casualties from enemy drones and artillery. Although it was said that smaller units of 2-3 members were trained in dispersal tactics, during actual combat, many soldiers gathered and moved together, resulting in heavy casualties from enemy drones and artillery fire. Due to a lack of knowledge of enemy tactics, when soldiers couldn’t locate the enemy, some units and companies ran along roads in large numbers, and as a result, enemy forces hidden in buildings and basements launched attacks on the exposed flanks and rear, causing significant casualties.“
The same document also notes the failure to timely evacuate wounded soldiers from the battlefield, seemingly placing blame on the Russian soldiers: “Although the Russian side was in charge of transferring them, it took over 10 hours for evacuation vehicles to arrive. The failure to evacuate the wounded promptly resulted in additional deaths during the evacuation process.”
Towards the end of the document, it notes: “While maintaining the principle of 2-3 member units during combat actions, never break away from the command of the unit or company.” This indicates that commanders may be attempting to prevent potential defections.
We do not know the name of the officer from whom these documents were found. One noteworthy detail is that, unlike other identification cards issued by the Russians to the North Korean soldiers—intended to conceal their origin but often revealing it through soldiers’ Korean signatures—this official’s ID does not show any Korean signature. Instead, it bears a random name assigned: Saruglar Bicheool Maaderoglu.


Another document found on the same soldier is titled “Video Meeting with the Commander of the Russian Airborne Troops Headquarters Command.” Written in Korean, it details the contents of the meeting with the Russian general, providing an overview of how Russia interprets the evolution of the Ukrainian forces’ combat tactics since Russia’s February 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine, as well as recent tactics, types of weapons, and electronic jamming systems employed by the Ukrainian forces on the battlefield. The meeting likely took place some time after August 2024, as the first part of the document notes that: “…during the past 2 years and 6 months of special military operations, the enemy’s behavior has clearly focused on attempts to break through weakly defended areas.”
One line states that “The enemy is using advanced equipment, such as NATO-provided precision-guided missiles (e.g., the “ADAMS” missile) and various aircraft systems. Moreover, they have been employing tactical firepower to strike rear areas up to 90-110 km from the front, resulting in losses for our forces.” It also notes that, “Recently, the enemy has been facing significant shortages of ammunition and combat equipment,” with an apparent indication of uncertainty regarding support of the incoming U.S. administration and its possible impact on the battlefield.
The last part of the documents provides tactical instructions issued for the use of North Korean forces on how combat should be carried out. One line urges that unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) teams be established and portable jammers be used for electronic warfare.
“Each company must organize at least one UAV team, and the company commander must organize 24-hour surveillance from the command post. No combat action should proceed without reconnaissance. Our primary mission is concealment. Each battalion should organize at least 2-3 UAV teams, and establish both day and night reconnaissance teams. Additionally, portable jammers should be used for electronic warfare, and anti-drone ammunition should be equipped (6-8 rounds).”
Another line of this document emphasizes using electronic devices, disconnected from the internet for security, to identify geolocations during operations planning and combat, instead of only relying on paper maps, which it describes as a “disadvantage.”
“Electronic maps should be effectively utilized. Relying solely on paper maps for operational planning and execution is a disadvantage in modern warfare. Electronic maps should be used for location identification, but electronic systems must be disconnected from the internet. Open communication itself is a suicidal action, as it exposes one’s position.“
The original documents and full translations are provided below.
- “Combat Experience and Lessons of the 94th Brigade”
- “Video meeting with the Commander of the Russian Airborne Troops Headquarters Command”
- Tactical instructions regarding how combat should be conducted


- Combat Experience and Lessons of the 94th Brigade
Experiences:
- If all front-line soldiers are prepared with strong ideology, conviction, and high combat morale, even enemies equipped with modern weaponry can be defeated through political and ideological superiority, as well as tactical advantage.
- During the two-day operation, combatants, despite facing enemy artillery bombardment and suicide drones attacking like swarms of bees, maintained a high level of mental and combat spirit, determined to execute the battle orders of the respected Supreme Commander at the cost of our lives. Displaying self-sacrifice, we advanced like tigers, forcing the enemy equipped with modern weapons to retreat and liberating the Plekhov region.
- The brigade commander, battalion commander, company commanders, and team leaders guided the troops with heightened alertness in our combat positions. We made accurate decisions and judgments in response to rapidly changing circumstances during the battle, adapting our command as needed to ensure the successful conclusion of the battle.
- During the battle, when company commanders and team leaders in charge of combat command were killed or injured, they quickly passed the combat responsibilities to the political officers, deputy commanders, and other staff officers, ensuring that the fight continued without interruption.
- Although it was said that we received intelligence from the Russian side about the enemy’s affiliations and capabilities, we were not familiar with crucial details such as enemy strongholds, drone launch sites, or artillery positions, and thus entered the battlefield unprepared.
- As a result, the enemy established strong defensive positions at key infiltration points of the battalions, and this resistance prevented the expansion of initial successes during the battle.
- To overcome this, some units engaged the enemy to hold them back while others flanked the enemy and struck them from the rear.
- Additionally, when the enemy used drones to track our movements and called in artillery strikes, we coordinated a decoy strategy and concentrated fire on the enemy drones, shooting down many of them. By taking cover in the basements of already secured buildings, we minimized personnel losses.
- In operations and combat, achieving stealth and surprise creates favorable conditions for mission success, disorients the enemy, and strengthens our hold on the initiative.
- From the departure waiting area to the attack starting point, the 1st Battalion advanced stealthily for 50 km, the 7th Battalion for 41 km, and the 10th Battalion for 43 km. We attacked the enemy from unexpected directions—north and east-west of the residential and forest areas—and swiftly concluded the battle 31 hours later.
- In particular, the 1st battalion made use of forests and cover to stealthily advance 9 km away from a drop-off point, and crossed the Psel River with three small boats, carrying only 2-3 people at a time.
- During the battle, the enemy put up a strong defense by relying on supporting positions, but we succeeded by attacking from both the front and the flank, creating favorable conditions for a decisive conclusion.
- Only when one recognizes the importance of ensuring communications in combat command and quickly implements the necessary measures can victory in the battle be ensured.
- To ensure effective command, four relay stations were set up close to the combat area. Plans were made for continuous power supply and recharging of handheld radios after each day’s combat, ensuring that communication was well maintained over the two-day operation.
- During operations (combat), the influence of seasonal weather, daylight, and terrain on combat actions must be carefully considered. Only with proper organization and execution of the battle can victory be achieved.
Lessons: - Anti-artillery operations to suppress enemy infantry forces and the neutralization of drone launch points should be carried out in cooperation with Russian forces to minimize combat losses.
- The failure to preemptively strike the enemy’s artillery and drone launch points in the Guyevo region led to personnel losses.
- In modern warfare, where real-time reconnaissance and drone strikes are conducted, failing to disperse combat teams into smaller units of 2-3 members could lead to significant casualties from enemy drones and artillery.
- Although it was said that smaller units of 2-3 members were trained in dispersal tactics, during actual combat, many soldiers gathered and moved together, resulting in heavy casualties from enemy drones and artillery fires.
- Due to a lack of knowledge of enemy tactics, when soldiers couldn’t locate the enemy, some units and companies ran along roads in large numbers, and as a result, enemy forces hidden in buildings and basements launched attacks on the exposed flanks and rear, causing significant casualties.
- The failure to respond proactively to changing combat conditions led to poor decision-making.
- Although we hoped that some enemy soldiers, terrified by our troops’ superior shooting skills and speed, would demand to surrender and be captured alive, our combatants, who saw our other comrades fall, ruthlessly killed those attempting to surrender. This only made the enemy resist more fiercely and prolonged the battle.
- In some instances, when soldiers were injured during combat, some rushed to rescue them without considering the enemy’s gunfire, artillery, or drone strikes, resulting in additional casualties. Over 10 such incidents were reported.
- The organization of casualty evacuation should be handled more responsibly and meticulously, especially in rapidly changing combat environments.
- Through cooperation with Russian forces, casualties were evacuated to the forward line of departure. However, due to constant changes in combat conditions, evacuation points were altered. Although the Russian side was in charge of transferring them, it took over 10 hours for evacuation vehicles to arrive. The failure to evacuate the wounded promptly resulted in additional deaths during the evacuation process. Additionally, there was an issue raised being not familiar with the procedures and order of transferring wounded to hospitals.
Key Considerations for Combat: - Maintain composure during combat: In some instances, urgent communication between combat teams using radios led to repeated transmissions, causing unnecessary delays.
- Form units effectively based on the combat situation: In forested areas, where visibility is limited, a staggered unit formation was optimal. In populated areas, it was best to organize the attacking unit, the covering unit, and the heavy weapons unit to provide cover for and support the actions of the main attacking unit.
- Neutralize enemy drones effectively: Drone surveillance and strike units should be organized into combat teams and companies. Once enemy drones are spotted, concentrated fire is needed to eliminate them.
- Minimize artillery damage: When enemy reconnaissance drones appear, artillery strikes inevitably follow. Soldiers must quickly take cover in basements or other concealed areas to minimize casualties from artillery fire.
- Rescue of wounded soldiers: When rescuing wounded soldiers, maintain composure and suppress nearby enemy fire before attempting rescue. Rushing without considering the situation can lead to further casualties from enemy snipers or concentrated fire.
- Adapt tactics to combat conditions correctly:
– One shouldn’t use tracer ammunition to lest exposing one’s positions.
– Ensure the fuses of grenades are kept dry to prevent misfires.
– While maintaining the principle of 2-3 member units during combat actions, never break away from the command of the unit or company.
– Always be cautious of enemy drones and snipers targeting unit leaders and command staff with radios, and soldiers carrying heavy weapons.


Source: Ukraine Special Forces
2. Video meeting with the Commander of the Russian Airborne Troops Headquarters Command
(<Dnipro> Army Group Command Center)
Characteristics of the Enemy’s Recent Operational Conduct:
Firstly, during the past 2 years and 6 months of special military operations, the enemy’s behavior has clearly focused on attempts to break through weakly defended areas. For these break-ins, 6-8 formations, consisting of 8-16 armored vehicles, maneuver together. The characteristic of these break-ins is that they penetrate the fire control zones of our forces and advance deep into the rear.
Secondly, after encountering our strong defense, the enemy quickly forces their way through narrow areas of our defense with armored vehicles, advancing deep into our rear. They then organize fire support to allow assault units to form defensive positions.
Thirdly, after suffering losses in the aforementioned operational approach, the enemy attempts to break through our defense zones by secretly infiltrating. Despite our strong firepower, the enemy has been executing operational plans to advance roughly 200 meters daily into our defense zones.
Fourthly, the method most actively employed by the enemy is fire suppression against fire support points and defense lines. They have been using artillery strikes of various calibers, targeting defense zones over 300-500 meters. They also place surveillance and support points in what is called the “gray zone,” aiming to block our offensive activities and hinder our advance. Additionally, they have been increasing the use of aerial mine dispersal, landmine deployment, and fire coordination.
Analysis of the Enemy’s Military Behavior from Another Aspect:
Firstly, the enemy is intensifying the use of artillery fire, UAV strikes, and mine dispersal against all moving objects. One of the most effective tactics the enemy is using is isolating the operational area. They are utilizing reconnaissance assets, electronic warfare units, and fire suppression methods to encircle our forces, repel reinforcements’ counterattacks, and block any communication between our units.
The enemy is using advanced equipment, such as NATO-provided precision-guided missiles (e.g., the “ADAMS” missile) and various aircraft systems. Moreover, they have been employing tactical firepower to strike rear areas up to 90-110 km from the front, resulting in losses for our forces.
Secondly, the enemy has recently been actively incorporating various unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into their operations, including 4-axis, 6-axis reconnaissance UAVs, attack and surveillance UAVs, suicide drones, and anti-infantry UAVs.
Thirdly, the enemy is actively conducting long-range artillery strikes. From beyond our artillery range, they are using 155mm howitzers, self-propelled artillery, and cluster munitions with a blast radius of 150 meters. Cluster munitions have been very effective in targeting manpower. They are also conducting area fire strikes on weak defended zones and using advanced weapons like the Javelin 5th-generation anti-tank missiles against armored vehicles. To eliminate manpower, they have been using various Western-made grenades and anti-tank launchers, along with 5.45mm and 7.62mm medium and light machine guns and 40mm grenade launchers. Additionally, they are integrating foreign-made combat technologies, including Soviet-era assault rifles and armored vehicles.
Characteristics of the Enemy’s 36th Independent Amphibious Assault Brigade: This brigade is composed of neo-Nazi elements and foreign mercenaries, including soldiers speaking Spanish and mercenaries from Latin American countries.
Expected Enemy Military Actions in the Kursk Direction: To control major roads, the enemy is actively conducting long-range artillery fire, planting both regular and magnetic mines, using 155mm rocket launchers, howitzers, and UAV strikes. They are also conducting 24-hour reconnaissance and surveillance with satellite systems, unaffected by weather conditions.
Recently, the enemy has been facing significant shortages of ammunition and combat equipment. They are focusing on using 3-4 mines to form small minefields and promoting long-range artillery fire with an 8km range. They are also actively employing hand grenades, smoke grenades, and various types of assault grenades, especially against light infantry.
Important Considerations After 10-12 Days: After 10-12 days, the leaves on non-coniferous trees and shrubs in windbreaks, woodland, and underbrush areas will fall, negatively impacting our camouflage. This will expose our positions to enemy reconnaissance and surveillance systems. The enemy, using infrared sensors, aiming devices, thermal imaging surveillance, and high-magnification cameras, could track our positions and movements. Additionally, the enemy is effectively using high-output radio jamming systems, achieving electronic warfare superiority over our forces.
Characteristics and Organization of the Enemy’s General Staff: The enemy’s joint forces, regular units, and independent units are generally organized into independent brigades. Each brigade consists of 3-8 independent battalions. Mechanized forces are organized into 3-4 mechanized infantry battalions, with a personnel strength of 420. One tank battalion and 2-3 infantry battalions are attached to the independent brigades. These brigades are capable of conducting operations both within their own units and as part of larger joint operations.


3. Tactical instructions regarding how combat should be conducted
Also, a battalion-level assault team should be organized into approximately 9 assault units, each consisting of 18 personnel, and the support unit should be established to guarantee the evacuation of the wounded. Generally, Russia maintains 4 companies as reserve or rotating forces.
While battalion-level units are supported by Russia for logistical supply, units below the battalion level must organize their own supply systems.
Issues to Consider in Operational Preparation and Execution:
– Losses are inevitable in unprepared operations. For example, one month after organizing an assault division in the Russian military, the soliders in that division were ordered to engage in battle. It took over a month for them to gain actual combat experience, during which they reportedly incurred significant losses.
– When organizing raids and attacks, defense positions should be well-organized. For example, after the first company attacks an enemy defensive position and takes up the defensive posture, the second company should use the first company’s position to advance toward the next enemy defense. It is crucial to consider that there may be no enemy defensive positions within a 1 km range, and without defense positions, the enemy’s counterattack becomes easier.
– Each company must organize at least one UAV team, and the company commander must organize 24-hour surveillance from the command post. No combat action should proceed without reconnaissance. Our primary mission is concealment. Each battalion should organize at least 2-3 UAV teams, and establish both day and night reconnaissance teams. Additionally, portable jammers should be used for electronic warfare, and anti-drone ammunition should be equipped (6-8 rounds).
Note: With the current combat equipment we have, we can easily eliminate the enemy. For example, destroying light armored vehicles can be achieved with an anti-tank launcher, and when eliminating tanks, the launcher can be used in a four-way firing mode.
– Communication means should be organized rationally. There are two types of communication equipment: Azart (a Russian military radio communication device with secure encryption) and Kirsan (a Chinese communication device with open communication). The issue of setting up repeaters should also be considered. Additionally, it should be taken into account that enemy jamming equipment could affect all communication means. Furthermore, when ensuring communication reliability, factors such as the daily battery consumption, available battery reserves, and the ability to recharge communication devices should be considered. It is also possible to ensure battery replenishment through unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
– Defensive Measures for Command Posts must be established. Frontline command posts should take into account the possibility of facing 1-4 artillery strikes per day. It must be remembered that all command posts are within the range of enemy long-range artillery and missile strikes.
– Management of troops, combat equipment, and replenishment must be well-organized. Statistical systems should be implemented to track casualty data, evacuation figures, ammunition consumption, and remaining supplies.
– Electronic maps should be effectively utilized. Relying solely on paper maps for operational planning and execution is a disadvantage in modern warfare. Electronic maps should be used for location identification, but electronic systems must be disconnected from the internet. Open communication itself is a suicidal action, as it exposes one’s position.
– The characteristics and drawbacks of aiming devices should be considered. When using night vision devices, thermal imaging surveillance equipment, and sights, the usage of the sight’s battery should be adjusted.
– Measures to counter the enemy’s electronic warfare tactics must be carefully considered.
– The timing for advancing combat actions must be carefully chosen. Raids are usually conducted by taking advantage of darkness, with the key times being from 6:00–9:00 in the morning and 5:30–9:00 in the evening, during twilight. It is important to carry out raids during these times. Also, in residential areas, the surveillance by enemy drones is disadvantageous.
There are also issues not mentioned here, but these should be addressed by strengthening cooperation with relevant Russian units.
Artillery fire support issues
… marked with a red cloth.
Note: During 5-6 days of combat operations, fatigue is inevitable, so it is necessary to organize rest for the troops every 2-3 days to recover combat capability.
Exclusive: Documents found on the body of a North Korean soldier in Kursk Oblast region (2)
- Exclusive: Documents and personal items found on the body of a North Korean soldier in Kursk Oblast region (1) - January 10, 2025
- Exclusive: Documents found on the body of a North Korean soldier in Kursk Oblast region (2) - January 9, 2025
- HRF’s Flash Drives for Freedom May Be Reaching Deep Inside North Korea via Balloon-Borne Packages: Kim Yo-Jong Confirms - January 8, 2025