How should we interpret China’s occasional release of detained North Korean refugees?

While China formally stands by its obligation to North Korea to repatriate escapees, many defectors arrive in South Korea after having been detained by Chinese public security.
According to Hanawon, the Ministry of Unification’s Settlement Support Center, of the 196 North Koreans who defected to South Korea in 2023, many had experienced detention in China.
Most defectors last year were women who escaped into China and eventually made it to South Korea. Many were victims of human trafficking forced into marriages in China. Some were caught and held as illegal immigrants. But many were then released and able to obtain temporary residence permits from Chinese authorities.
Kim, 31, who fled from North Korea’s Ryanggang Province in February 2017, was caught by public security in Dunhua, Jilin Province, but was released and managed to find her way to South Korea.
Similarly, Jo, 29, left Hoeryong in North Hamgyong Province in August 2016 and stayed in Heilongjiang Province, where she was captured by public security.
No relaxation in overall policy
Defectors say the release of some detainees is down to the judgment of specific regional public security departments. Financial and social interests often influence such decisions.
“The police are more lenient with a defector who has Chinese relatives with a stable financial background or who has children from her Chinese husband,” a defector explained.
Despite the appearance of relaxation of the rules, defectors say that this does not signal a formal change in China’s repatriation policy.
The relationship between the two states is bound by strategic interests, and the defector issue falls victim to complex calculations. North Korea demands repatriation of its citizens to prevent the implicit challenge to the regime’s claim to have created paradise when people want to leave. China, meanwhile, repatriates defectors to preserve border stability.
Chinese public security officials argue that helping refugees would encourage North Korean border guards to desert their posts, which would in turn lead to mass defections and possible regime collapse.
However, these fears are misplaced. It is unlikely that Kim Jong-un’s regime would collapse solely due to defections.
It maintains strong internal controls and, just as it withstood a devastating famine in the 1990s, would weather a surge in defections. That said, the defector issue could serve as a variable and heighten discontent and fuel a spirit of defiance.
The risk of instability
In such a case, North Korea would further tighten border controls and enhance internal surveillance. It might also consider redefining its relationship with China.
China is unlikely to stop the repatriations because it still needs North Korea as a buffer zone, and North Korea heavily relies on China’s economic support. For their cooperation over defectors to change would require a third force. That is most likely to come, if at all, in the form of international pressure and diplomatic efforts.
The international community should persistently pressure and persuade China to protect defectors on humanitarian grounds. The defector issue is not merely a bilateral matter between North Korea and China but a shared responsibility of the international community.
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