What are they afraid of? Why are some of America’s leading experts on Korea scared of criticizing the South Korean government?
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Something rather unusual – and frankly welcome – occurred in late April 2026: the rare shattering of a Washington, D.C., taboo.
A group of more than 50 Republican members of Congress issued a statement addressed to South Korea’s ambassador to the United States, criticizing the policies of the current leftist South Korean government under President Lee Jae-myung.
Although the statement focused primarily on alleged discrimination against U.S.-owned companies in Korea, it also raised concerns of a political and foreign policy nature. The Lee administration was accused of being a “left-wing government closely aligned with China,” an opinion that is widely shared but not usually expressed in public statements by politicians, former military officers, current and former government officials, human rights activists, and Korea experts.
The mere fact that a large number of American legislators have now found it necessary to openly criticize the policies of the South Korean government has certainly raised eyebrows.
It is also being positively received by pro-U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK), who have long hoped for such frankness from American politicians.
When it comes to U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East, American area experts at major think tanks and in academia – as well as media pundits, politicians, and former high-ranking military officers serving as commentators or advisors – have rarely been reluctant to criticize governments and leaders.
Even the closest U.S. allies have not escaped such scrutiny. At times, the criticism has been harsh, often focusing not only on relations with the United States and broader international issues, but also on the domestic policies of those nations.
In recent years, however, South Korea has been a notable exception. Why is that? What factors might explain what amounts to a taboo in Washington, D.C.? This peculiar form of timidity – almost fear – appears to have five main sources.
One source is a “don’t rock the boat” mentality. It is based on the notion that the U.S.-ROK relationship is like an extremely fragile piece of fine porcelain, which could suddenly and irreparably shatter if not handled with the utmost care.
The theory seems to be that even justified and necessary criticism of a South Korean government by experts or politicians could damage the relationship and must therefore be avoided.
This reluctance has not always been present, but over the past 30 years it has been most frequently applied to left-wing South Korean governments. It thus reflects, at least in part, a fear of criticizing the Korean left.
Another source stems from careerism. American think tank experts, former government officials, and retired high-ranking military officers are often reluctant to speak out publicly against a South Korean government – even when they believe its policies may harm important U.S. interests – because they fear such criticism could limit future career opportunities.
There is concern that open disapproval might reduce the chances of being appointed U.S. ambassador to Seoul or securing a senior position at a consulting, lobbying, or defense-related firm that does business with Korea. The prestige and financial incentives associated with such roles can act as powerful disincentives to speaking out. In these cases, career considerations may take precedence over principle.
Conformism is another key factor. The relatively small number of individuals in Washington, D.C., whose work focuses on Korean political issues has resulted in a degree of cliquishness.
This exclusivity, in turn, fosters a kind of “groupthink,” in which certain approaches to analyzing and discussing Korean issues are considered acceptable, while others are treated as taboo. To be regarded as part of the “inside” circle of Korea experts and commentators, individuals may feel pressure to adhere to these unwritten norms.
This dynamic does not apply to everyone in the field, but it is a tendency that some more independent-minded and intellectually honest Korea experts privately acknowledge – and occasionally criticize.
This reluctance to criticize leftist South Korean governments is not always rooted in ideology. Many experts and institutions involved are centrist or center-right, though ideological inhibitions do exist among some center-left individuals and organizations.
Another often overlooked factor is a lack of detailed knowledge or sustained interest in South Korean domestic politics and how those politics shape foreign policy.
Among Korea specialists, there is a strong focus on North-South relations—such as inter-Korean dynamics, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, the role of U.S. forces in the South, and the broader military balance on the peninsula. While important, this focus can come at the expense of understanding domestic political dynamics in South Korea, even though those dynamics directly influence foreign policy decisions.
In some cases, this has led to a false dichotomy between domestic and foreign policy, producing reluctance to comment on issues perceived – incorrectly – as purely domestic or partisan.
This represents a clear double standard. Many in Washington are willing, even eager, to criticize the domestic politics of other U.S. allies, yet seem hesitant – almost fearful – when it comes to South Korea.
A final factor is the presence of a “normalcy bias” regarding South Korea and its governments.
This bias is more psychological than ideological. It manifests as a comforting but misleading belief that the U.S.-ROK alliance is so deeply institutionalized that it will endure indefinitely without serious disruption – regardless of how any particular government’s policies might affect U.S. interests.
While this assumption may appear to reinforce confidence in the alliance, it can be dangerous. It risks downplaying or ignoring emerging problems and discourages serious consideration of potential changes in the relationship.
Such normalcy bias may leave Korea experts unprepared for significant shifts driven by the policies of left-wing South Korean governments.
It is entirely possible for the people of the United States and South Korea to share broad values, and this is undoubtedly important. At the same time, their respective governments may hold values that are not fully aligned.
Although most South Korean governments have historically been pro-U.S. and supportive of the alliance, this should not necessarily be assumed to be a permanent or “normal” condition.
Paradoxically, while many South Korean experts and commentators—particularly on the left—have become increasingly willing to criticize, and even harshly condemn, the United States, many American Korea experts have moved in the opposite direction, showing strong reluctance to openly criticize South Korean governments, especially those on the left.
This trend is likely driven by one or more of the factors outlined above.
A more intellectually honest and healthy approach would require greater willingness among Americans to move beyond cliquishness, conformism, and careerism—and to abandon the self-imposed taboo against publicly criticizing South Korean governments when such criticism is warranted.
Since such frankness is routinely applied to other allied nations, South Korea should not be treated as an exception. Criticism of its current leftist government should not be considered “off-limits.”
Lawrence Peck is a correspondent for NK Insider based in Seoul and Los Angeles. Having intensively researched and closely monitored the activities of pro-North Korea and other extremist groups and activists in the U.S. for over 25 years, he has been recognized in the U.S. and Korea as one of the leading American authorities on such topics, and has lectured, written extensively and been interviewed on such topics in the U.S. and Korea. He has a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and a Juris Doctor degree from Loyola Law School of Los Angeles. He previously worked in Korea for several of the largest Korean business groups in the fields of intellectual property licensing and international business development. He also serves as an advisor to the North Korea Freedom Coalition of the U.S. Lawrence may be reached at the email address: lawrence.nkinsider@gmail.com
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