The long arm of Pyongyang: Secret police use family ties to hunt defectors
North Korea is getting more sophisticated in how it targets defectors (Image: NK Times)
North Korea’s feared secret police is using brokers who funnel money from defectors to their families in the impoverished country to recruit them and persuade them to return home.
The state’s intelligence operatives are exploiting the defectors’ effort to support relatives and send them money via remittance brokers.
The Ministry of State Security is managing an unknown number of the remittance brokers operating along the North Korea–China border.
Their mission is to gather information on defectors living illegally in China or contacting them from South Korea, and to recruit and persuade them to return. It is not apparent at this stage how successful they are proving to be.
The secret police reportedly use the overseas communication networks established by remittance brokers along the border to obtain defectors’ personal details and information about their family relationships. This information is then used for intelligence gathering and to approach potential targets of operations.
Some brokers have reportedly been pressured to approach defectors and pass on personal information.
The testimony of those contacted in this investigation indicates that brokers use family members remaining in North Korea to persuade defectors to return, as well as to identify and connect the bureau with individuals who may be willing to cooperate.
The details of these operations emerged more clearly through testimony from remittance brokers working in China.
The names and locations of those quoted here are withheld for security reasons.
Broker A
Q. Have you ever received a request for cooperation from authorities inside North Korea? If so, when was it?
A. Yes. It has been a long time since I was first asked to spy for them.
When you work in this business, you naturally become connected with people from the Ministry of State Security and with remittance brokers inside North Korea who operate under their instructions. During that process, they make proposals using your family as leverage.
They told me that if I maintained a good relationship with them, they would guarantee my family’s safety and even waive the remittance fees.
Q. What kind of information do they ask for?
A. All kinds about someone who sends money. Their name, age, the year they defected, where they live, what they do for a living, and so on.
I cannot do everything they demand simply because they order me to. There is a lot I do not know, but even if I did know, revealing everything would result in the people involved being arrested and punished. I do not believe a decent person should go that far.
Still, because my own family remains in the North, I cannot completely ignore them either. Depending on the circumstances, I provide only information that I believe will not cause serious problems.
Broker B
Q. When did you first receive a request for cooperation from the Ministry of State Security or remittance brokers inside North Korea?
A. It happened the year the pandemic began. A woman in North Korea who I had regularly contacted disappeared for a while, then contacted me again three months later, saying that helping with some work there would be good for both her and me. I figured she must have been arrested and then released.
Q. Were you able to refuse?
A. They know where I am from, who my family members are, and where they live.
In that situation, everybody knows very well that directly rejecting their proposal would inevitably expose our families in North Korea to threats or other disadvantages. It is not easy to refuse under those circumstances. I needed time to think.
Q. What did you ultimately decide?
A. In reality, I had no other choice. I could not openly refuse, so I pretended to cooperate while avoiding their calls or occasionally giving them irrelevant or inaccurate information.
If you show no response at all, they threaten you in various ways. But when you provide false information, they quickly realize that something is wrong. They may then threaten you by saying things like, ‘Nothing good will come from making fools of us.’
There are many difficult situations. At those times, I pretend not to understand how the world works or deliberately act like a foolish person.
Q. Who do they primarily try to approach?
Judging from what they ask for, they appear to be targeting defectors who have settled in South Korea.
I understand that they are particularly interested in locating defectors who come from inland regions such as Pyongyang, South Pyongan Province, and Hwanghae Province.
Q. Are there cases in which they directly try to persuade people to return?
A. I understand that in some cases, they arrange video calls with family members in North Korea who try to persuade the defector to return. They use family members to emotionally unsettle the person.
These accounts were corroborated by the testimony of one North Korean defector.
Mr. Park, who reached South Korea in the early 2010s, told NK Times that he had recently spoken with his family by video for the first time in several years. The call was arranged by a remittance broker inside North Korea.
“There were bruises on their faces, and they looked extremely frightened,” he said. “The moment I saw them, I realized that the call was not taking place in a safe or free environment.”
“My wife repeatedly urged me to return to North Korea, saying, ‘Come back to the embrace of the motherland and your family. Even the Party will forgive everything.’ It broke my heart to see her pleading so desperately. I blamed myself that my family members might be suffering harassment because I had contacted them.”
Park said the incident also left him deeply suspicious of the remittance network operating inside North Korea.
The Ministry of State Security’s use of remittance brokers stems from the desire of defectors to maintain contact and support their families and the fact that the brokers are the crucial link that makes this possible.
Information obtained during the remittance process – family relationships, contact networks, places of residence, and occupations – can be used not only to monitor the defectors but also to recruit them and persuade them to return.
“We should pay attention to the fact that North Korean intelligence operations are becoming increasingly covert, shifting away from direct contact and toward the exploitation of existing relationships of trust and informal networks built around people’s livelihoods,” said a security expert in Seoul specializing in North Korea.
“When connections that defectors cannot easily sever, such as family remittances and communication networks, are used as operational tools, those involved may be exposed to sustained psychological pressure. This can also deepen anxiety and mutual distrust between defectors.”
Such operations serve to undermine any trust and cohesion in overseas North Korean defector communities.
“We need to closely track the overseas operations of the North’s spy agencies that exploit remittance networks and channels of communication with family members,” he said.
Sewon is the North Korean-born founder and CEO of NK Times, a Seoul-based Korean-language online news outlet focused on North Korean affairs. Drawing on his personal experience living in the country, he strives for transparency and accuracy in reporting, working to inform the public about the realities of North Korea.
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