When the U.S. steps in, North Korea listens and learns
The U.S. Military’s GBU-57 Bunker-Buster Bomb. (Image Credit: Creative Commons)
On June 22nd, 2025, the U.S. military, authorized by Donald Trump, dropped multiple GBU-57 bombs on three of Iran’s key nuclear facilities: The Nantanz Nuclear Facility, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, and the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant.
Working with the Israeli military, Trump’s decision to carry out a direct offensive on Iran’s plants has consequences that reach far beyond the Middle East.
In particular, his actions allow us to analyze the position of the United States under his presidency and how America’s nuclear policy, which now focuses mainly on deterrence, might shift in the years to come.
Also, Trump’s actions in Iran could affect North Korea’s nuclear posture. Kim Jong-un and his allies are paying close attention.
The U.S. decision to strike Iran shows that Washington, previously seen as risk-averse, is now willing to use force preemptively.
In particular, the strike challenges existing nuclear deterrence scholarship which mandates that the mere possession of nuclear weapons by a state is enough to deter armed conflict.
Scholars such as Vipin Narang point out that not all nuclear states hold equal power. Narang suggests that different nuclear postures, and not just possession, can produce varying levels of deterrence. Specifically, asymmetric escalation postures, in which a state signals readiness to quickly escalate to nuclear use, can be more effective at deterring conflict than by simply having the capacity to retaliate.
Even states that possess secure second-strike capabilities – known as assured retaliation – often fail to deter serious conventional attacks by stronger powers. Given this, Narang drives the point that nuclear deterrence is not automatic or equally distributed. Smaller powers must do more than simply acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter aggression.
In relation to the Israel-Iran conflict, with the U.S. militarily backing Israel, we can see these academic theories play out in real time. Iran does not have an operational nuclear arsenal but has been advancing its nuclear program in recent years. Israel has been unwilling to admit just how many nuclear weapons it has in its arsenal. However, Israel does maintain enough weapons to retaliate massively if attacked. In other words, it has a sufficient arsenal to secure second strike capability.
The U.S. presence also bolsters the strength of Israel’s deterrence posture by adding the threat of overwhelming conventional and nuclear retaliation against Iran.
Iran crossed the threshold into acquiring nuclear weapons but failed to develop an asymmetric escalation posture (meaning credible, ready-to-use weapons).
Scholars subscribing to the belief that basic deterrence is not enough posit that Iran will continue to fail to deter Israeli or U.S. strikes against its forces and/or nuclear facilities. This has proven to be true with the latest Iran-Israel war. Because the U.S. and Israel possess extremely powerful nuclear weapons as well as military might, the simple threat of Iran potentially building nuclear weapons has been enough to worry the U.S. and its allies, but not enough to deter an attack.
Unlike Iran, North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and subscribes to the concept entitled asymmetric escalation. It has demonstrated willingness to use nuclear weapons early and offensively in order to prevent a regime change. This approach is seen to be more successful at deterrence than Iran’s.
North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and not just a threat of developing them is enough to stop the U.S. and its allies in the Korean Peninsula from taking outright military action against Pyongyang.
If Iran’s nuclear posture was more like that of North Korea, such as credible threats of early use with a full nuclear arsenal, it could have potentially deterred U.S.-Israeli military action against its nuclear facilities.
Thus, Washington’s choice to intervene in the Iran-Israel conflict sends a clear message to other states – especially North Korea – that ambiguous claims about possession of nuclear weapons are not a strong enough deterrence. Deterrence effectiveness depends less on having or developing nuclear weapons and more on how states plan to use them.
North Korea’s strategy demonstrates that credible escalation threats, readiness to use these weapons, and a nuclear posture that strikes a balance between deterrence and reducing risk can be more effective than merely the threat of possession.
Maren is a recent graduate of Tufts University, where she earned a B.A. in International Relations and minored in French. She is currently interning with NK Insider through the Oslo Scholars Program, an initiative that connects students and recent graduates with human rights activists around the world.
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